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NOTE
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW-DAMAGE CLAIMS IN POLLUTION
ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER SECTION 304
OF THE FEDERAL CLEAN AIR ACT
That damage is caused by air pollution is unquestioned. 1 The Clean
Air Act, Congress' response to the problem, gives citizens the right in
Section 304 of the Act to bring civil suits in the United States district
courts against industrial polluters who are violating the substantive
provisions of the Act. 2 Of crucial importance to a plaintiff suing under
Section 304 is whether he can recover money damages for the harm
he has suffered as well as injunctive relief.
Section 304(a) provides that:
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-(1)
against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who
is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or
limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation. . .

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, with-

out regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties, to enforce such an emission standard or limitation, or such
3
an order. ....

The initial question is whether this section of the Clean Air Act
permits civil damages. Although jurisdiction to enforce an emission
standard or limitation or order would presumably allow the remedy of
injunction or mandamus, allowance for civil damages is not apparent.
The plaintiff's task will be either to try to persuade the federal district
court to allow damages under this clause or to successfuly allege both
a cause of action for injunctive relief under Section 304 and a cause of
action for damages under state nuisance law and attempt to retain
federal jurisdiction over the damage claim through the doctrine of
1. See Hearings on H.R. 15848 (1970) Amendments to the Clean Air Act) Before the
Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-49, pt. 1, at 5-6 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Hearings of
the House Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare). See also Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Report on the Economics of Clean Air 1-9 to 1-15 (1970); Council on
Environmental Quality, The President's 1971 Environmental Program, 1971, in 1 A. Reitze,
Environmental Law 3-22 (1972); Comment, Equity and the Eco System: Can Injunctions Clear
the Air?, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1254 (1970).
2. Clean Air Act §304(a), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(a)(1970).
3. Id.
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pendent jurisdiction. By a third method the plaintiff might argue that
Section 304(a) constitutes a law of the United States under Article III
of the Constitution and that the federal district court could retain
jurisdiction over a state created claim for damages through the
doctrine of protective jurisdiction.
THEORIES FOR STATING A FEDERAL CLAIM FOR RELIEF
The two strongest arguments for allowing damages under Section
304(a) are: (1) such a cause of action should be implied in order to
effectuate the purposes of the Clean Air Act; (2) such a cause of action
can be incorporated into the federal common law of nuisance for air
pollution. A third argument is predicated upon the assertion that the
right to clean air is a "public" constitutional right protected under
the 14th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1971) against state
invasion of that right. 4 This Note will not deal with the issues in the
third argument.
The Threshold Question of FederalJurisdiction
The question whether a cause of action is to be implied or included
in a federal common law could be raised in either a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a federal claim or in a motion to dismiss for lack of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. The latter approach was foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood,5 where the plaintiffs
sought to recover damages from FBI agents for alleged violations of
fourth and fifth amendment rights. In reversing the lower court's
dismissal for lack of federal question jurisdiction, the Court held:
[W]here the complaint . . . is so drawn as to seek recovery
directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the
federal court, but for two possible exceptions (where the claim is
immaterial or insubstantial and frivolous) . . . must entertain the
suit. . . . The reason for this is that the court must assume
jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of
as well as to determine
action on which the court can grant relief
6
issues of fact arising in the controversy.
A.

4. Under this theory state action would occur in the federal and state governments' failure to
enforce the Clean Air Act regulations against a polluter. See Note, Toward a Constitutionally
ProtectedEnvironment, 56 Va. L. Rev. 458 (1970).

5. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
6. Id. at 681-82. See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 649 (1963); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)(cases affirming the general rule of Bell v. Hood,
supra note 5).
Citing Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959), Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972) held that
an issue of federal common law implementing a federal statute arises under the laws of the
United States and therefore would support federal subject matter jurisdiction. Under the Bell v.
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A claim for damages under Section 304(a) cannot be said to be
immaterial or insubstantial and frivolous because a construction of the
language of Section 304(a) is necessary to determine whether
"jurisdiction to enforce an emission standard" includes jurisdiction to
award damages as a method of enforcing such standard. 7 If a court
should hold that such damages are not allowed, the dismissal would be
on the merits and not for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
The distinction between dismissal for want of subject matter
jurisdiction and dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is important for res judicata by bar. A cause of action
is normally extinguished by dismissal on the merits, but this is not so
when a cause of action is dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 8 For example, if there were a conflict among the federal
circuits-some rejecting and some accepting the remedy of damages
under Section 304(a)-the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by a district court in the first group would not preclude bringing
the action in a court in the latter.
The choice between dismissal on jurisidictional grounds and on the
merits is also important for the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction: a
court dismissing a federal claim on the merits may arguably retain
pendent jurisdiction over a state claim for damages if that claim is
tied closely to an important question of federal policy such as
injunctive relief under Section 304. 9
B. The Doctrine of Implied Remedies
1. Relevant Case Law:
An implied cause of action is a judicial extension of a civil remedy
to one injured by another's breach of a statute or regulation not
providing for such relief. Most American courts now recognize the
implied remedy in at least limited areas. 10 The doctrine was first
Hood doctrine, if issues of federal common law were in fact not stated, the claim should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim and not for want of jurisdiction.
7. The general rule stated in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921)
is:

The general rule is that, where it appears from the bill or statement of the
plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the construction or the application
of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such federal claim is not
merely colorable, and rests upon a resonable foundation, the District Court has
jurisdiction under this provision.
See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821); Osborn v. Bank of United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824); Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936).
8. Note, Implying Civil Remedies from FederalRegulatory States, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 285, 289
(1963).
9. Text at 530-31 infra.
10. The doctrine had its origin in Couch v. Steel 3 E. & B. 402, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854).
Today, however, it has largely been repudiated by English courts. See Williams, The Effects of
Penal Legislationin the Law of Tort, 23 Modem L. Rev. 233 (1960).
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enunciated in the federal courts in 1916 in Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby," although the impetus for this decision dates to Marbury v.
Madison.12 Creating a private damage remedy for an employee
injured by a Railroad's violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts,
the Supreme Court states: "A disregard of the command of the statue
is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover
the damages from the party in default is implied.
"13 Speaking
for the Court, Justice Pitney noted further that:
None of the Acts, indeed, contains express languages conferring a
right of action for the death or injury of an employee; but the
safety of employees . . . is their principal object . . . (Thus)
the inference of a private right of action in the present instance is
rendered irresistible .... 14
Although it has been held that the Federal Safety Appliance Act no
longer provides a basis for an implied cause of action for damages, 15
the doctrine of implied remedies has been applied to other federal
statutes and consitutional provisions with increasing frequency. The
rationale has generally been that when federal statutes have given a
general right to sue, damages are necessary and appropriate to make
good the wrong done and to effectuate the purpose of the Act. 16 For
instance, damages have been allowed under the Railway Labor Act 17
for the failure of a collective bargaining agent to represent black
firemen, 18 under the Civil Rights Act of 186619 for violation of rights
created by that Act,2 0 under the 1965 Voting Rights Act 2 1 for
violation of rights created by that Act, 22 under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution for unreasonable searches and for
deprivation of liberty in violation of due process of law, 23 under
11. 241 U.S. 33(1916).
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803): "...
it is a settled and invariable principle in the
laws . . . that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress. "

13. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, supra note 11 at 39-40.
14. Id.
15. Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
16. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). Cf. Bell v. Hood, supra note 5 at 684;
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, supra note 6 at 396.
17. 45 U.S.C. §§151a, 152 (1970).
18. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§1982 (1970).
20. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968).
21. 42 U.S.C. 91973 (1970).
22. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
23. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, supra note 60.
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193424 to sellers of
securities, 25 under the Postal Statute of the United States26 for abuse
of franking privileges, 27 and under the Indian Civil Rights28 for
29
violations of rights created by that Act.
The most important decision for claimants under Section 304 of the
Clean Air Act is I. I. Case Co. v. Borak. 30 There, the Supreme Court
construed the language of Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 which conferred jurisdiction on the district courts "to enforce
any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder." 3 1 (emphasis added) This language is strikingly similar to
the language in Section 304(a) of the Clean Air Act. The Court held
that stockholders had a right of action for damages where false
statements had been used in proxy solicitation contrary to the
proscription of Section 14(a) of the Act. Speaking for the Court,
Justice Clark recognized that "the broad remedial purposes" of the
Act were directed to "the protection of investors, which certainly
implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve
32
that result."
Two theories have usually been advanced to explain the implication of a civil cause of action from the violation of a statute. Under
one view the statute provides the evidence of the standard of conduct
required within the framework of an already existing cause of action.
Violation of a federal statute under this theory would itself be a tort
which necessarily gives rise to an action for damages. 33 A second
theory regards the statue as declaring wrongful certain behavior from
which the Court itself creates a new cause of action. The latter theory
34
allows the Court great power of judicial legislation.
24. 15 U.S.C.§78j(b)(1970),

25. Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971); see
also John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1971) and Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1961) where damages were held to be the appropriate remedy for
buyers of securities under Section 10(b).
26. 39 U.S.C. §3210 (Supp. 1973)
27. Hoellen v. Annunzio, 348 F. Supp. 305, 311 (N.D. Il. 1972).
28. 25 U.S.C. §§1301-1303 (Supp. 1973).
29. Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370, 374 (D. N.M. 1971).
30. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
31. 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1970).
32. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra note 30 at 431-32. See also Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970)(affirms holding in Borak).
33. See e.g., Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (E. D. Pa. 1972); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E. D. Pa. 1946); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 286 (1965).
34. This theory makes the doctrine of Implied Remedies virtually identical to the doctrine of
a federal common law, one aspect of which would allow a federal district court to fashion an
appropriate remedy to implement an express provision of a federal statute. See the discussion of
this doctrine infra at 518-22.
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2. The Doctrine applied to Section 304 of the Clean Air Act:
The argument for implying a cause of action for damages for
citizens suing a polluter under Section 304 of the Clean Air Act
begins with a demonstration of the overriding purpose of the Act. This
purpose is to insure that the health and welfare of the nation's citizens
is not damaged by polluted air. 35 The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 set forth the initial federal policy that:
.. .it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government
to use all practicable means to improve and coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the
Nation . . . (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, produc6
tive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.3
Federal regulation was deemed necessary to control air pollution
because of its serious danger to the American environment. 3 7 The
principal federal standard in the Clean Air Act which effectuates the
Act's purpose-the primary ambient air standard-is grounded on
scientific evidence of the actual damages and adverse effects of air
38
pollution.
In an action brought by the United States under the Clean Air Act
prior to its 1970 amendments to restrain a food processing manufacturer from emitting air pollution, the United States Court of Appeals
for the 4th Circuit held that the Clean Air Act provides all citizens
with a federally protected right to clean air. 39 This right, based upon
the purposes of the Clean Air Act, would also follow naturally from
the tacit acknowledgment by the Supreme Court and other federal
courts that there is a fundamental public right to a clean
environment. 40 Therefore, it can be argued that federal courts should
35. The purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's
air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population." Clean Air Act §101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §1857(b)(1) (1970).
36. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §101, 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1970).
37. As stated in Hearings of the House Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare, supra note
1, air pollution is not simply an unaesthetic eyesore; it causes death, serious personal injuries
and damages vegetation and building materials. Furthermore it was noted that air pollution had
reached such high levels in New York City during Thanksgiving of 1967 that 168 people were
killed and countless others injured and sickened by it.
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in his Report on the Economics
of Clean Air, supra note 2, has stated that sulfur oxide pollution (the most common kind of
industrial pollution) itself costs the nation approximately $13,780,000,000.00 each year.
38. Clean Air Act §109(b), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4(b) (1970).
39. United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 904.
40. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (concern with interstate water
pollution); Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972) (concern with automotive
air pollution); Udall v. F.P.C., 387 U.S. 428 (1967) (concern with recreational purposes); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966) (concern with gasoline emitted into navigable
waters); United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. (1933) (concern with conservation);
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have the power to imply a remedy of damages for violations of this
41
fundamental federal right.
The express purpose of Section 304, "to provide citizen participation in the enforcement of standards and regulations established under
the Act," 42 provides an additional reason for implying a cause of
action for damages. One important consideration in enacting the
citizen suit provision was that the federal and state authorities had
been somewhat "restrained" in their promulgation and enforcement
of the pre-1970 air quality standards. 4 3 In the only case taken to the
Courts under the 1967 Air Quality Act, United States v. Bishop
Processing Company,44 for example, the effectiveness of governmental
action under the Act is seen to be transparent. 45 Furthermore, despite
the Clean Air Act's provision allowing the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency or a State to bring an enforcement
action of a civil fine action, 46 at the present time there has been no
reported case of such an action. In fact, it appears that the
Administrator has been less than zealous in performing even his
nondiscretionary duties under the substantive provisions of the Clean
Air Act. 4 7 In order to encourage citizens to assist the government and
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) (concern with
recreational purposes).
41. Text at 513-515, supra. Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy
for an invasion of federally protected rights. See Nixon v.Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Stvafford c.
Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902). Also, the "familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial
legislation is to be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967); cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225-26 (1966), is another
reason for implying a remedy of damages under Section 304. Because its central purpose is to
protect the health and welfare of citizens, the Clean Air Act falls into the category of remedial
legislation.
42. Senate Comm. on Public Words, Report on National Air Standards Act of 1970, S. Doc.
No. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (Comm. Print 1970). (hereinafter cited as Senate Report).
43. Id at 37: "It is the Committee's intent that the enforcement of these control provisions
be immediate, that citizens should be unconstrained to bring these actions, and that the courts
should not hesitate to consider them."
44. 423 F.2d 469.
45. During the period 1956 to 1970 the Bishop Processing Company operated a rendering
plant which processed fish, chicken feathers, heads and entrails, sickening the residents of
Bishop, Maryland and the adjoining town of Selbyvill, Delaware. During this time there were
numerous attempts by citizens and federal and state agencies to abate the smells coming from
the plant. Finally, on June 4, 1970, after a United States District Court decree to cease all
operations, an appeal of that decree to the Second Circuit and a denial of the petition for
certiorari by the Supreme Court, Bishop Processing Company was ordered to cease all
operations. On July 14, 1971, the plant was held in contempt by the District Court for failure to
close its operations. However, no penalty was imposed and the Judge ruled that the plant could
remain open if it installed control equipment and cleaned the plant weekly. As of July 29, 1971,
the plant was still in operation. Reitze, supra note 1 at 3-27 to 3-29; Washington Post, July 29,
1971, at B 1; J. Esposito, Vanishing Air 114-18 (1970).
46. Clean Air Act 113, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8 (1970).
47. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D. D.C. 1972) (predicated upon
legislative intent, the Court held that the Administrator would be enjoined from approving state
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participate in the enforcement of the Clean Air Act standards,
damages would be a strong incentive. The fields of anti-trust
legislation and securities fraud involve two areas of precedent for
private damage actions as a supplement to enforcement of federal
48
regulatory statutes.
Two other reasons exist for allowing damages under Section 304.
First, the deterrent effect of a private action for damages will provide
a strong incentive for industry to comply with the Clean Air Act's air
standards and implementation plans. 49 There is no guarantee that
industrial sources of air standard violations will otherwise stop their
polluting activities when called upon to do so by aggrieved citizens. 50
Second, industrial polluters should not be allowed to benefit from
their violations of air quality standards at the expense of the health
and welfare of private citizens. Such rationale has been utilized by
the Supreme Court in Schine Chain Theatres v. United States5 ' as a
basis for awarding damages against a defendant violating the Sherman
52
Anti-Tnist Act.
C. The Doctrine of the FederalCommon Law of Nuisance
1. Relevant Case Law:
Governmental power in the United States is divided by the
Constitution between the states and the federal government. 5 3 In the
landmark decision of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 54 Justice Brandeis
declared that the Constitution did not give either the federal courts or
Congress power to create substantive rules of general common law. 5 5
Nondelegated powers, therefore, were reserved to the states; federal
courts were to apply the decisional and statutory law of the state in
which they sat unless authority over the issue had been constitutionalimplementation plans which allowed existing clean air to be degraded by rising to pollution
levels of the secondary standard level).
48. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (Court
referred to the private damage suit as the "bulwark of antitrust enforcement"); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. at 432 (Court noted that private enforcement of the proxy rules of the Securities
Exchange Act provided a necessary supplement to Securities Exchange Commission action).
49. See 377 U.S. at 432: "(T)he possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a
most effective weapon (against defendants) in the enforcement of the proxy requirements." See
also Note, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from Congress, 12
B.C.L. Rev. 571, 612 n.265 (1970-71).
50. See Bishop Processing Company example supra note 45.
51. 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948).
52. 15 U.S.C. §1,2 (1970).
53. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the States all powers not delegated to the United
States.
54. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55. Id. at 78.
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ly vested in the federal government. 56 In Hinderliderv. La Plata River
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 57 decided the same day as Erie, Justice
Brandeis stated that the construction of a water compact apportioning interstate streams was beyond the judicial competence of any one
state and must be governed by federal common law. 58 Erie and
Hinderlider thus apportioned state and federal judicial power to
reflect the division of governmental powers inherent in American
federalism. 59
It is now recognized that federal courts are competent to fashion
federal common law to implement express provisions of the Constitution or federal statutes. 60 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills61
the Supreme Court required a federal district court to fashion a
remedy of specific performance of an executory agreement to
arbitrate in order to effectuate the policy of the National Labor Laws.
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas stated:
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some
substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do
in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of
express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the
legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by
the nature of the problem. 62
The doctrine of the federal common law was extended by a
unanimous Supreme Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee63 wherein
56. Summarizing in Erie Justice Brandeis stated: "(T)he lower courts have invaded rights
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the Several States." Id. at 80. This
language suggests that the Tenth Amendment furnishes the Constitutional authority for the
decision.
57. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
58. Id. at 110.
59. See Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
383, 394-95, 407 (1964).
60. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) wherein Justice
Jackson stated:
Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is
conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the
traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of
the common law in cases such at the present.
Accord, Sola Elec. Co v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.173, 175-77 (1942); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (remedy in tort fashioned against a
telephone company because of the comprehensive federal regulation of telephone companies);
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of
NationalandState Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797 (1957).
61. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
62. Id. at 456-57.
63. 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (water pollution case).
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it was held that a federal common law of nuisance should govern
cases that involve ambient or interstate air and water pollution. 64 In
that case the state of Illinois sought a private remedy of abatement
against the City of Milwaukee for dumping sewage into Lake
Michigan. Although the Water Pollution Control Act 65 (under which
the action had been brought) did not allow for the remedy of a private
cause of action, the Court held that such a remedy could be fashioned
in order to effectuate the strong federal interest embodied in the
Act. 66

2. The Doctrine applied to Section 304 of the Clean Air Act
In this case the theory of the federal common law is somewhat
similar to that of implied remedies. Under the federal common law
theory the remedy of damages is fashioned by the federal court; under
the implied remedies theory, the same remedy is implied from the
statute. This distinction is based upon legislative intent. For instance,
a remedy can be implied from a statute if the court determines that
the legislature would have allowed that remedy if it had thought of it.
On the other hand, a remedy can be fashioned to implement a federal
common law covering the subject matter that might not have been
allowed if the legislature had thought of it. The court's authority for
fashioning such a remedy is the strong federal interest over the subject
matter that the federal statute opens. The same reasons that have
been used herein for implying a remedy of damages are available in
order to include damages in a federal common law of nuisance. 67
Federal common law is available to implement the provisions of
the Clean Air Act for two further reasons: (1) Congress intended to
provide for ultimate federal control in the area of air pollution despite
64. Id. at 103. See also, Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972) (air

pollution case).
65. 33 U.S.C. §1151 et. seq. (1970).
66. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 101-103. Writing for the Court Justice Douglas
recognized that the right asserted was a federal right, governed by federal laws and remedies:
The remedy sought . . . is not within the precise scope of remedies prescribed
by Congress. Yet the remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily the
only federal remedies available. 'It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion
federal law where federal rights are concerned.' Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,

353 U.S. 488, 457. When we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate
aspects, there is a federal common law, . . . (406 U.S. at 103).
Furthermore, Justice Douglas distinguished Illinois v. City of Milwaukee from Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), a case in which the supreme Court had
declined original jurisdiction to hear an interstate water pollution suit, because the latter case
was preoccupied with public nuisance under Ohio law and not federal common law
implementing a federal envionmental statute. 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.3.
67. Text at 516-18 supra.
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the fact that the purpose of the Act declared that "(T)he prevention
and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility
of States and local governments."-68 (2) Air pollution is interstate in
character.
The policy of the Water Pollution Control Act was "to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the
States in preventing and controling water pollution." 69 Interpreting
the Act's provision for promulgation of water quality standards by a
federal administrator in cases of state inaction, 70 Justice Douglas
concluded in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee that71Congress intended to
provide for ultimate federal control in the area.
Similarly, the language implying ultimate federal control in the
Clean Air Act is as broad as it is in the Water Pollution Control Act.
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency promulgates the national air quality standards72 and approves or disapproves
all state implementation plans. 73 If a state fails to submit an
implementation plan or its plan fails to meet the Act's requirements,
74
the Administrator must establish a plan for the state.
As emphasized in the Illinois case, the nature of the dispute and not
the character of the parties must be interstate in order for a federal
common law to fashion an appropriate remedy. 75 Federal common
law is necessary in interstate pollution suits to prevent one state from
imposing its common law upon another. 76 Justice Douglas's extensive
quotations from Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 77 and Missouri v.
Illinois78 suggest that there is a duty upon federal courts to fashion
federal common law to settle interstate disputes because the states
surrendered their right to settle such disputes amongst themselves
when they entered the federal union. 79
In dealing with air, it is fruitless to try to characterize it as
"intrastate." Air not only flows interstate, air pollution directly affects
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Clean Air Act §101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. §1857(a)(3) (1970).
33 U.S.C. §1151(b (1970).
33 U.S.C. §1160(c)(2) (1970).
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 102.
Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4(1970).
Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-5 (1970).

74. Id.
75. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
76. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1906) holds:
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each other, is that
of equality of right. Each State stands on the same level with all the rest. It can
impose its own legislation on no one of the others.
77. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
78. 200 U.S. 496, 520-21 (1906).
79. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 104.
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most aspects of interstate commerce. 80 Congress based its power to
enact the Clean Air Act on the Interstate Commerce clause of the
Constitution. 8 1 The Clean Air Act was held to be a constitutional
exercise of congressional power in United States v. Bishop Processing
Co.82
D. Necessity of Allowing Air PollutionDamage
Claims in FederalCourts
If a federal court would either imply a remedy of damages under
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act or fashion such a remedy because
there is a federal common law of nuisance, it seems clear that the
court would be performing a lawmaking function. The weaknesses of
the court as lawmaker-the lack of debates and hearings, the
retroactive effect of its solution, the uncertainty of its public
mandate 83 -are less serious when conduct has already been proscribed
by a legislative or administrative standard and only an additional
remedy is sought. The court may be in an even better position to
provide the proper remedy than was the legislature because the court
will have the advantage of the experience with an existing and
84
functioning statute.
It can be argued that a federal remedy of damages can be utilized
whenever the Clean Air Act standards have been violated.85 The
amount can be based on common law standards of proof.86 Congress
has stressed that the "(e)nforcement of pollution regulations is not a
technical matter beyond the competence of the courts."8 7
If, on the other hand, federal remedies under the Clean Air Act
were limited to injunction or mandamus, victims of pollution
violations would be obliged to go into state courts for remedial relief.
80. In testifying before the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare concerning
the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, stated that:
The . . . bill does break new ground in its recognition of the fact that the
Nation's air resource is invisible. Air, polluted or not, crosses the imaginary lines
that divide State from State. Air Quality, therefore, is not a matter of purely local
or regional concern. It is of national concern. Hearingsof the House Subcomm. on
Public Health and Welfare, supra note 1).
81. Senate Report, supra note 42 at 1-2.
82. 423 F.2d 469. See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
83. Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, supra note 8, at 291.
84. See Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 Harv. L Rev. 1439, 1453-54
(1972); see also Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 195-200 (1898).
85. In this regard, it has been noted that the various federal environmental protection
statutes could "provide useful guidelines in fashioning (the) rules of decision" for the common
law. Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 103 n.5.
86. See generally W. Prosser, Law of Torts 602-603 (1971).
87. Senate Report, supra note 42 at 38.
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And if the law of the State happened to attach no responsibility to
violations of the pollution laws, the entire purpose of the Citizen Suit
provision could become nugatory. As an example of this problem, it is
generally held that the traditional common law remedy of nuisance
requires a showing that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable. 88
"Unreasonableness" varies greatly from state to state8 9 depending
upon the benefits a particular state identifies in a polluting industry.
Additionally, state law may provide other obstacles to effective relief.
Statutes of limitation or prescription, security for costs statutes,
procedural barriers such as compulsory joinder of necessary parties
and the like could foreclose claimants from any compensatory
redress. 90
Because of the possible difficulties in state litigation of air pollution
damage claims, such claims properly belong in a federal court so that
a federal uniformity and consistency of interpretation are possible. In
ambient air pollution cases the combination of a burgeoning amount
of federal legislation directed towards the preservation of the
environment and the federal interest involved present a case of far
greater federal concern than has been found in previous cases. 91 By
granting damages federal courts could begin to identify environmental interests protected by the common law, and could insure that the
common law requirements imposed on conduct are consistent with
statutory environmental ordering. 92 Finally, it should be noted that if
there is a federal preemption where national air quality standards
have been established, 93 damages should be allowed in federal court
because this would be the only forum in which such an issue could be
94
litigated.
E. Statutory Obstacles
1. Legislative Scheme:
The argument can be made that damages under Section 304 are
illogical since the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
88. W. Prosser, supra note 86 at 591-602.
89. Id. The balancing process employed by common law courts in determining whether to
abate a nuisance was developed within the field of private nuisance actions.
90. Cf. J.I. Case Co. Borak, 377 U.S. 426(1964).
91. See Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality: Some
Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 691 (1971) (commentary cited by Justice Douglas
in the Illinois case).
92. See Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, supra note 84 at 1455.
93. Washington v. General Motors Corp., supra note 64 at 115 suggests this may be the case.
94. State and local governmental units, including state courts, probably are not equipped to
regulate and control the harmful effects of air pollution. Despite the advantages of local control
and despite Congressional rhetoric, federal supervision is gradually preempting development of
state and regional programs. See J. Esposito, supra note 45 at 16; Rossano, Federal Abatement of
Major Intrastate Air Pollution Sources, in Proceedings: The Third National Conf. on Air
Pollution 480, 481 (U.S. Dep't of H.E.W. 1966).
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Agency or a State, in bringing an action under the Act, is limited to
remedies of enforcing compliance with standards, injunctive relief, or
civil fines. 95 The thrust of this argument is that damages would
constitute a windfall recovery to some plaintiffs in the instances when
the Administrator or State had not acted. 9 6 Furthermore, a citizen
suit cannot be started within 60 days after the plaintiff has given
notice of the violation to the Administrator and the State, and if the
Administrator or State files a suit within that time, the citizens cannot
file under Section 304(a). 97 The answer that can be made to this
argument is that citizens are always allowed to intervene in any civil
action brought by the Administrator or State. 98 Therefore, it can be
argued that citizens should always have the right to intervene in order
to assert the remedy of damages, and thus there would be no windfall
if the Administrator or State had not acted because the right to
damages would always exist.
Another adverse argument would be that there is no need for the
incentive of damages because Section 304 already provides adequate
incentives for citizens to bring suits. These are: (1) that the Court
may award costs (including reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees) to any party it deems appropriate, 99 and (2) that Section 304(e)
allows plaintiffs to seek any other relief for violation of any emission
standard under any other statute or common law. 100
Although it is true that the cost provision is an incentive for citizens
to bring suits, it does not detract from the additional incentive of a
damage remedy. Providing costs would not allow for any affirmative
recovery as damages would.
The argument has been made that damages are not allowed under
Section 204 because Section 304(e) preserves the right to seek this
remedy under another law. 10 1 It can be argued, however, that this
section does not restrict damage actions under Section 304(a). It only
provides that the federal courts have not preempted the field in air
pollution cases. Under the Clean Air Act, States are allowed to have
emission standard limitations which are higher than necessary to meet
95. Clean Air Act §113, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8 (1970).
96. Under Section 304(b)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857g-2(b)(1)(B) (1970)
citizens cannot bring suits under Section 304(a) if the Administrator or State has commenced an
action against a polluter and is diligently prosecuting the same in a court of the United States or
in a state court.
97. Clean Air Act §304(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(b)(1)(A) (1970).
98. Clean Air Act §304(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(b)(1)(B) (1970).
99. Clean Air Act §304(d), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(d) (1970).
100. Clean Air Act §304(e), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(e) (1970).
101. Senate Report, supra note 42 at 38:"It should be noted, however, that the section
[Section 304(e)] would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if
damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available."
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the national ambient air standards. The purpose of Section 304(e),
then, could well be to express Congress' intent that citizens can sue
under other laws for violations of more stringent standards than the
minimum set by the Clean Air Act.
2. Legislative History:
Statements of at least two Senate Floor Leaders of the Clean Air
02
Act Bill indicate that Section 304 does not provide for damages.' If
this is, indeed, the legislative intent, the argument for legislating
judicially an action for damages, at least under the doctrine of
implied remedies, is weakened because the legislature may well have
settled the question.
It is a familiar principle that the best evidence of legislative intent
is in the words of the statute itself. 103 Nowhere on the face of Section
304 is a damage remedy excluded. By stating that the district courts
shall have jurisdiction to enforce an emmission standard, 10 4 damages
can properly be awarded as a method of such enforcement. 10 5 Isolated
statements of legislative intent should not restrict what the statute
implies.
Such an approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in authorizing federal district courts full power to award appropriate relief
(equitable and legal) under a federal statute if the statute expresses
10 6
strong federal interests and does not on its face restrict that power.
0
7
In Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry,1 the Secretary of Labor brought an
action to enjoin violations of Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act' 0 8 which makes it unlawful for an employer to
discharge or discriminate against an employee because the employee
had initiated a proceeding under the Act. In ordering the further
remedy of reimbursement of lost wages as part of its inherent power
to give effect to the policy of the Act, the Supreme Court ignored a
House Committee report which had stated that such reimbursement
102. Speech by Senator Muskie, 116 Cong. Rec. 33102, (1970); Speech by Sanator Hart, 116
Cong. Rec. 33104, (1970).
103. United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) holds:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than
the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.
Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of
the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning.
See also Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 U.S. 392, 400 (1966); Flora v. United States,
357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958); Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260-61 (1945).
104. Clean Air Act §304(a), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(a) (1970).
105. Text at 516-18, supra.
106. Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960).
107. Id.
108. 29 U.S.C.§215(a)(3) (1971).
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would not be allowable. 10 9 Citing Brown v. Swann 10 Justice Harlan
stated:
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is
not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid
legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a
necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized
and applied. 'The great principles of equity, securing complete
justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful
construction.""
A citizen seeking damages for past injury under Section 304(a)
would be invoking a federal district court's equity jurisdiction because
he would also be seeking either the equitable remedy of injunction or
mandamus to prevent future pollution violations. These remedies
seem clearly to be allowed by Section 304(a). It is also a general rule
that equity courts have the power to decree complete relief and for
112
this purpose may accord what would otherwise be legal remedies.
Such rule has permitted one federal district court to imply the
remedy of damages from Section 17(a) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act' 13 despite the fact that the legislative history indicated
that the Act was only to be enforced by injunction or criminal
action. 114
In light of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills11 5 it can be
argued that federal courts would provide a damage remedy if the
federal policy of preventing air pollution was thought to be very
great. In Textile Workers an executory agreement to arbitrate
between a labor union and an employer was specifically enforced.
Such remedy was not afforded in the statute as construed. Also,
executory agreements to arbitrate in this situation would not have
been enforceable at the time in a federal court because of the
common law and the Federal Arbitration Act."1 6 In effect, the Court
decided that the policy in the Labor Management Relations Act 1 7 of
maintaining industrial peace was so great that a remedy would be
fashioned to enforce that policy even though it was excluded by the
language of the Federal Arbitration Act and by the common law.
109. Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. at 295.

110. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 496, 503 (1836).
111. Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, at 291. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.

375, 386 (1970); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
112. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
113. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §17(a), 15 U.S.C. §78q (1971).
114, Dorfnan v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
115. 353 U.S. 448(1957).
116. 9 U.S.C. §1 (1971) See Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 466-67 (J957).
117. 29 U.S.C. §151 (1971).
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Such a strong contradictory expression of legislative intent-the
command of another federal statute-is not involved with respect to
damages under Section 304 of the Clean Air Act.
THE DOCTRINE OF PENDENT JURISDICTION
Victims of pollution violations can attempt to establish federal
jurisdiciton over a damage claim based upon state nuisance law by
filing citizen suits for injunctive relief under Section 304(a) of the
Clean Air Act and appending the state law damage claim as a second
cause of action. The argument that the federal district court can
properly retain jurisdiction to decide the damage claim rests upon the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. The current standards for the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction over a state claim have been set forth
in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. 118 These standards are phrased in
terms of: (1) a federal district court's power to exercise jurisdiction
over a state claim, and (2) the court's discretionary exercise of that
power.
A. Power to Exercise Pendent Jurisdiction
Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution the federal courts
are empowered to hear and decide all cases in law and equity arising
under the laws of the United States. It has long been held that when a
federal claim is an ingredient of the case a federal court has the
power to decide the entire case even though other questions of law or
fact may be involved." 9 Assuming substantiality of the federal claim,
jurisdiction attaches at the filing of the complaint, and the court in 2its
0
discretion has the power to decide all the state law questions at all.1
12
1
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant union had engaged in a secondary boycott against the coal
company with which he had been employed, thereby violating
Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1 22 and the
Tennessee common law of conspiracy. In examining whether the
district court properly entertained jurisdiction of the claim based on
Tennessee law, the opinion of the Court by Justice Brennan articulated the present standard for determining the circumstances in
which a federal court has the power to preside over a pendent state
claim: "The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the court [and] the state and federal
118.
119.
120.
Slier v.
121.
122.

383 U.S. 715 (1966).
Osborne v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1938);
Louisville & N. By., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).
383 U.S. 715 (1966).
29 U.S.C. §187 (1971).
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claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." 123 If
these requirements are met, then the federal court may properly
retain jurisdiction over the state claim. The Court also formulated the
test in the alternative:
But if, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming
substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts
to hear the whole. 124
The substantiality of the federal claim is ordinarily to be determined
from the pleadings.1 2 5 It has been held that an insubstantial federal
claim just appear plainly so,' 26 or to be "so attenuated" or frivolous as
to be "absolutely devoid of merit."' 12 7 Expressing itself more specifically, one federal court has stated that an insubstantial federal claim
is one unable to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
128
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Claims for injunctive relief under Section 304 are, of course,
substantial ones provided the substantive and venue provisions of the
statute are met. 129 An appended state claim must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact. However, a strong argument can
be made that a claim for injunctive relief under Section 304 and a
damage claim under state law do not meet this test. Because Justice
Brennan used the word "operative" to identify the word "fact," the
facts that must have a "common nucleus" would be those tending to
prove each of the claims. 130 These facts of proof would be substantially different for each claim. Under Section 304 these facts need only be
those which will show a violation of an emission standard or an order
issued by the Administrator or the State. 131 On the other hand, the
facts necessary to prove a common law nuisance action for damage
are those which will show duty of due care on the part of the
123. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 726.
126. Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. at 324.
127. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 683; accord Levering
& G. Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933).
128. A. H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products Corp., 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393
U.S. 835.
129. Clean Air Act §304(c), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(c) (1970).
130. Interpreting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, Denys Fisher v. Louis Marx & Co., 306 F.
Supp. 956, 960 (N.D. W. Va. 1969) held:
. . . whether the particular character of (the state claim) is sufficiently 'related'
to the federal (claim) is primarily an issue of identity of proof.
131. Clean Air Act §304(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(a)(1) (1970).
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defendant, breach of that duty, causation, injury and damages. 132
Since none of the elements of proof in the damage claim would be
necessary in the federal claim, 133 it could be argued that a federal
district court would not have jurisdiction over the state damage
claim.
The argument in favor of finding that the two claims derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact begins with Gibbs and its stress on
the word "fact" and not the word "proof." The act upon which a
claim for injunctive relief under Section 304 and a damage claim
under state law is based would most likely be the act of a smelter
polluting the air. Such an act would be an operative act and thus
would constitute the common nucleus of operative fact, or causative
fact, 134 upon which both claims would be grounded.
Secondly, in properly defining the term "common nucleus of
operative fact" anology can be made to an area definitionally close to
pendent jurisdiction-compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As noted by the Supreme Court,
the Federal Rules manifest the intention to encourage the resolution
of all aspects of a dispute in one suit, and to that extent they
emphasize policies similar to those underlying the concept of pendent
jurisdiction. 135 Furthermore, the policy of compulsory counterclaims
is grounded in notions of judicial economy, fairness and convenience
to the parties, 136 notions which have been identified in Gibbs as basic
13 7
to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
Rules 13(a) instructs federal courts, when possible, to adjudicate
counterclaims growing out of the "same transaction or occurrence" as
the plaintiff's claim. It has been held that the claims arise out of the
"same transaction" if the facts of the claims have a "logical
relationship" to each other. 1 38 Interpreting this language, one federal
circuit has held that a counterclaim was complusory if it grew out of
132. F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 74 (1956).
133. Certainly these facts would not "overlap considerably," River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v.
General Foods Corp., 334 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1964), or be "substantially identical," Obrien v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 293 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1961).
134. Several federal courts have construed the language "common nucleus of operative fact"
to mean "causative set of facts." See, e.g., Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1972);
Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. N.Y. 1972); Peerless Dental
Supply Co. v. Weber Dental Mfg. Co., 299 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
135. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 n. 13; Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274
U.S. 316, 320 (1927).
136. See, e.g., Green, FederalJurisdictionOver Counterclaims, 48 Nw. U. L. Rev. 271, 276-77
(1953).
137. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; see also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S.
397, 405 (1970).
138. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926) (interpreting Equity
Rule 30 which was the basis for Federal Rule 13a).
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the "same basic controversy" as the principle claim. 139 It can be
argued, therefore, that the "same basic controversy" amplification of
the "logical relationship" formula is a realistic definition of "common
nucleus of operative fact" in the pendent jurisdiction doctrine
because it directs the inquiry to ascertaining whether the claims
asserted are part of a single lawsuit and would ordinarily be litigated
on one judicial proceeding.140
B. DiscretionaryExercise of Pendent JurisdictionPower
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs broadened the discretion of federal
district courts to exercise or not to exercise their power to invoke
pendent jurisdiction. 141 Trial courts, it said, were instructed to look to
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants" in exercising their discretion, and to avoid needlessly
deciding questions of state law. 142 The decision appeared to require
that dismissal of state claims should occur in three situations: (1) if the
federal claim, even though substantial enough to confer jurisdiction,
were dismissed before trial; 143 (2) if the state issues substantially
predominate over the federal issues in terms of proof, scope, or of the
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought; 144 or, (3) if the possibility of
jury confusion would justify separating the state and federal claims for
trial. 145 Finally, the Court noted that the discretion to dismiss state
146
claims exists throughout any case.
It appears likely that at least one of the three situations for
dismissal of a state claim would be present were a state claim for
damages appended to a federal claim for injunctive relief under
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act. 14 7 However, the argument would be
139. Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633-34 (3rd Circ.
1961); see also Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Ca. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir.
1970).
140. This is the alternative test of the Gibbs case, Text at n. 124, supra.
141. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726:
That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has
consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
not of plaintiff's right.
142. Id. at 726.
143. Id.
144. Id.at 726-27.
145. Id. at 727.
146. Id.
147. The claim for injunctive relief could be dismissed before trial either because of
procedural defect or because the defendant polluter would have closed down its operation. It.
can also be argued that the issues in the state claim in terms of proof and the comprehensiveness
of the remedy sought substantially predominate over these issues in the claim for injunctive
relief. Note the development of this argument as based on the lack of federal court's power to
exercise pendent jurisdiction, Text at supra. There is probably no reason to believe that any jury
confusion would occur from appending a damage claim to a claim for injunctive relief.
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stronger for retaining the state claim if it were closely tied to
questions of federal policy, 148 as was the case in Gibbs itself where the
scope of the state claim implicated the federal doctrine of
preemption. 149 The argument for retaining the damage claim, therefore, is based upon the fact that a state common law of nuisance
which allows for damages is closely tied to both a claim for injunctive
relief under Section 304 and the federal common law of nuisance in
air pollution suits. 150 Also, the damage claim "implicates" the cogent
federal policy of preventing the harmful effects of air pollution on
public health and walfare. 15 1 If a federal remedy of damages is not
allowed under Section 304 of the Clean Air Act, assumption of
jurisdiction over a pendent damage claim could be justified because
the specific federal relief is inadequate to fully vindicate the federal
2
interest that the substantive right to clean air reflects.15
Since pendent jurisdiction is directed toward the conservation of
53
judicial energy and the avoidance of a multiplicity of litigation,'
presumably it would not be good policy to require victims of
pollution violations to have to go into state court to protect some of
their rights when all of their rights could more economically be
determined in one forum, here the federal court. The federal system is
not a mixture that is wrapped in neat packages marked all federal or
all state. 154 Especially where there are strong federal links in the field
of air pollution, the distinction between federal and state law begins
to blur. 155 One commentator has summed this up by stating:
148. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727:
There may, on the other hand, be situations in which the state claim is so closely
tied to questions of federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent
jurisdiction is particularly strong.
149. Id.
150. See Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972) accord Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
151. Clean Air Act §101, 42 U.S.C. §1857 (1970). See also Clean Air Act §109, 42 U.S.C.
§1857c-4(1970) which states that the national ambient air quality standards are fully applicable
to the states.
152. Accord, Note, UMW. v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 668
(1967-68). See also Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 1971)
(held that a pendent state claim for misappropriation of trade secrets made the exercise of
federal jurisdiction appropriate because the claim implicated federal patent policy); Mishkin,
The Federal "'Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 167, 172-73 (1953)
(argument made that where the complaint asserts a claim of federal right which is substantial
but not yet established as a matter of law, the case is one in which adjudication by a federal
court is most appropriate and deterrence of access to federal jurisdiction most clearly
undesirable.)
153. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. at 405 (federal statutory claim joined with a constitutional
claim that would have required a three-judge court.).
154. H. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 540
(1954).
155.

Id.
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. . . we may fail to keep in mind the fact that the relationship
between the state and federal governments in the United States is
not at all comparable to the relationships that exist between
sovereign nations, nor is it even fully comparable to the relationships that exist between states. If there is going to be deference, it
must be integrated deference by the parts to the whole and to the
about. It is not
parts by the whole. That is what federalism is all
156
susceptible to a mechanical division of functions.
THE DOCTRINE OF PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills 157 two members of the
Supreme Court rejected the view that federal common law was to be
applied to that case, but concurred in the result of the theory of
protective jurisdiction. 158 The basics of this have been well stated by
Justice Frankfurter:
Called 'protective jurisdiction,' the suggestion is that in any case
for which Congress has the constitutional power to prescribe
federal rules of decision and thus confer 'true' federal question
jurisdiction, it may, without so doing, enact a jurisdictional
statute, which will provide a federal forum for the application of
state statute and decisional law. Analysis of the 'protective
jurisdiction' theory might also be attempted in terms of the
language of Article III-construing 'laws' to include jurisdictional
statutes where Congress could have legislated substantively in a
field. This is but another way of saying that because Congress
could have legislated substantively and thereby could give rise to
litigation under a statute of the United States, it can provide a
federal forum for state-created rights although it chose not to
adopt state law as federal law or to originate federal rights. 159
This theory of protective jurisdiction could be utilized in order to
provide a federal district court subject matter jurisdiction over a state
created damage claim under Section 304 of the Clean Air Act. Section
304(a) is a jurisdictional statute, and a claim for damages would
"arise" under this "law" of the United States. Although the remedy of
damages is not spelled out, such a remedy could have been afforded
by Congress.
The argument for protective jurisdiction rests on Chief Justice
156. Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of FederalAncillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 759, 781 (1972); see also the Federalist, Nos. 6-17 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton); The
Federalist, No. 46 at 292 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison).
157. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
158. Justices Harlan and Burton, concurring in the result, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957).
159. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at
473-74. See also Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 216, 224-25 (1948); Mishkin, supranote 152 at 184-96.
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Marshall's opinion in Osborn v. Bank of United States,160 wherein it
was stated that Congress could authorize a bank chartered by the
federal government to sue in federal court even though only state
issues were involved, and on two cases permitting a trustee in
bankruptcy to pursue in federal court a private cause of action arising
under, and completely governed by, state law. 16 1 It is true that in
those cases there is, in the background at least, some federal right
other than the bare right to sue in federal court.162 Justice Frankfurter
apparently assumes, however, that for protective jurisdiction there
need be no federal law "somewhere in the background." 163 Nevertheless, claims for damages under Section 304 of the Clean Air Act
would have a federal law in the background, that being the question
whether Clean Air Act standards had been violated. Therefore the
doctrine of protective jurisdiction in this case is based on Osborn. The
argument can further be supported by the belief that protective
jurisdiction theory protects a strong federal interest which should not
1 64
be discriminated against in the state courts.
Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, in a dissenting opinion in
which he considered the arguments at great length, asserted that
" 'protective jurisdiction,' once the label is discarded, cannot be justified under any view of the allowable scope to be given to Article III
[of the Constitution]." 165 The principle reason is that the protective
jurisdiction theory would vastly extend federal jurisdiction. "For
example," said Frankfurter, "every contract or tort arising out of a
contract affecting commerce might be a potential cause of action in
the federal courts, even though only state law was involved in the
decision of the case." 1 66 The protective theory would also reflect an
inadequacy on the part of state tribunals to determine state law, an
assumption that would presumably do violence to the judicial
67
system.1
It is asserted by the author, that the doctrine of protective
jurisdiction should be available to damage claimants under Section
304 of the Clean Air Act only as a last resort. Because the precedent it
would establish would have such drastic consequences on the
160. 22 U. S.(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
161. Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934); Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947).
162. The bank's very existence was a creature of federal law; in the bankruptcy cases the
trustee was an officer of a federal court, and his ancillary suit was a part of the whole
bankruptcy process, itself governed by federal law.
163. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 474.
164. This reason overlaps with the reasons given to support each of the previous two theories
for maintaining federal jurisdiction.
165. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 474.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 475.
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accepted understanding of Article III as a limitation on the federal
courts, it is believed that most federal courts would decline the
opportunity to exercise it.
CONCLUSION
A plaintiff seeking damages under Section 304 of the Clean Air Act
should be permitted to avail himself of federal jurisdiction. This Note
has discussed three methods by which this might be accomplished.
The first method involves a process of judicial construction of Section
304(a) allowing for a federal claim for damages. The second is based
upon the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction over state claims. The third,
and most tenuous, is based upon the doctrine of protective jurisdiction. Within these theories lies federal jurisdiction over such a claim
for the plaintiff and the federal judge who wish to see the federal
courts compensate these injuries.
CHARLES ANTHONY SHAW

